

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG-2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY *T* PER *EUR 30* TOTAL COPIES *6* RUN BY *28*

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED **SECRET**

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ACTION UNIT *EUR 30*
RF FILE VR *DDO*
ACTION #

"EYES ONLY"

1 604753 EIA836 PAGE 01 IN 795558

TOR:151902Z JAN 76 68796

SECRET 151705Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE [] 68796

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLKMBALL

NELSON FROM MEYER

REF: [] 09548

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AC/FC

4086

Did a copy of this ever go to the Perm Staff?
please see...
Self...
...

1. REFERENCE FROM [] INFORMS [] THAT SENATOR HART OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE WILL BE ATTENDING CONFERENCE AT [] 30 JANUARY TO 1 FEBRUARY. HE HAS REQUESTED THAT [] ARRANGE WITH [] FOR BRIEFINGS ON SERIES OF SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO HIM AND SELECT COMMITTEE. THEY ARE THE DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN A. SECURITY AND THE SECRET SERVICE AND B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. HE GOES ON TO REQUEST BRIEFINGS ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR COVERT OPERATIONS AND POLITICAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL OPERATIONS WITH [] IN ADDITION HE WANTS BRIEFINGS ON INTELLIGENCE BUDGET ALLOCATION AND COORDINATION AND SYSTEM FOR APPROVAL OF MAJOR INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS. SENATOR HART ALSO WANTS A BRIEFING ON [] AND HOW IT WORKS.

2. [] HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY [] OFFICER AND [] HAS

SECRET

**Not Renewed*

7-71 MFG. 2/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY _____ PER _____ TOTAL COPIES _____ RUN BY _____

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
T 604753 EJA836 PAGE 02-02 IN 795558

TOR:151902Z JAN 76 68796

ADVISED THAT WILL DO THEIR BEST TO PROVIDE INFORMATION SENATOR HART WANTS BUT THAT SOME OF THE INFORMATION COULD NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE, HE IS PROPOSING A JOINT MEETING WITH FOR GENERAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND WITH AT ON THE WORKINGS OF THERE WILL BE CHANGES IN THE SCHEDULE AND WILL BE ADVISED BY AT A LATER DATE.

3. THERE IS NO INDICATION IN THE TRAFFIC THAT CIA HAS BEEN INFORMED BUT WE PRESUME THAT OFFICIALS OF THE AGENCY HAVE OR WILL BE CONTACTED BY SENATOR HART OF HIS STAFF ON THE MATTER.

4. NO FILE. E2, IMPDET.





~~WALKER~~
WALKER
MAYBE

(24)

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<i>C/EA3</i>			<i>DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF,</i>
ACTION #		<i>DDD</i>	<i>SADD OLC,</i>

STAFF	
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T 595025 EIA412 0 PAGE 01-01 IN 791659

TOR:122154Z JAN 76. 21007

S E C R E T 122040Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE 21007


TO: INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL RANDALL AND ADDABBO

- REFS: A. 35606 (iw787635)
- B. 35661 (iw790579)

 STATION MUCH APPRECIATES ADVANCED REPORTING
ON CODELS. WAS HELPFUL WITH THE RANDALL GROUP, AND AM SURE
WILL BE VALUABLE WITH ADDABBO GROUP AS WELL. REGARDS. E2 IMPDET,





FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75

Waller
Waller
File

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY *28* PER *SOP 112* TOTAL COPIES *10-1* RUN BY

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ACTION #

RF FILE VR *DCI/REVIEW STAFF*
CS/RF DDO SA/DO D/LC

T 592728 ETA152 PAGE 01 IN 790651

TOR:112233Z JAN 76

21000

S E C R E T 112220Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE 21000

TO: IMMEDIATE INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: 15837 (in 787572)

1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DESIRES REFERENCED MEETING AT 0800 AND WILL EXPECT CONTACT FOR DETAILS UPON HIS ARRIVAL.

2. HE IS VERY EASY TO TALK TO AND AM SURE YOU WILL ENJOY THE MEETING. HE MET HERE WITH HEADS OF LIAISON SERVICES, ABOUT 45 MINUTES WITH EACH. HIS PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS ARE WHAT THEY THINK OF THE CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS, WHAT IMPACT HAVE THEY HAD ON FOREIGN INTEL RELATIONS, ETC.

3. HE HAS A MINOR HEARING PROBLEM, SO SHOULD ARRANGE TO HAVE HIM SEATED AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO

4. BEST REGARDS. E2, IMPDET.

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PRIORITY
PRECEDENCE

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RF. FILE. VR. DCI/REVIEW STAFF
CS/RF, DDO, SADD, D/OLC

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T 592741

EIA165

PAGE 01

IN 790652

TOR:112313Z JAN 76

21001

SECRET 112305Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE [] 21001

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA RTBUSHEL (DUCKETT)

SUBJECT: MILFORD VISIT

1. COS SPENT ABOUT EIGHT HOURS WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ON 10 JANUARY, AND BELIEVE HE WENT AWAY TOTALLY SATISFIED THAT HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED HIS OBJECTIVES HERE. HE MET WITH

[]

EACH FOR ABOUT 45

MINUTES AND ALL MEETINGS WENT WELL. ALSO WORKED THE MEETING IN WITH THE NASA REP AND THAT ALSO APPEARED TO GO WELL, AS DID THE MEETING ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT.

2. INCIDENTAL CONVERSATIONS HELD [] DEALING WITH TERRORISM QUESTION. ENTIRE DELEGATION WAS VERY FRIENDLY AND A PLEASURE TO DEAL WITH. [] PRESENCE WAS AN ASSET.

3. DETAILED SUMMARY OF DAY'S ACTIVITY BEING FORWARDED THIS DATE. E2 IMPDET.

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O FILE VR DCI (REVIEW STAFF)
C/EA3 DDO CS/RFS ADDDO OLC

T 592369 EIA799 PAGE 01 IN 790579

TOR:111013Z JAN 76

35661

S E C R E T 110937Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE 35661.

TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE

NIACT

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL ADDABBO

1. COS BRIEFED REPS ADDABBO, EDWARDS AND ROBINSON AND MESSERS PRESTON, SNODGRASS AND CARY ON 11 JAN IN COS OFFICE. ONE HOUR SESSION WAS BASICALLY QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD CONCERNING TARGETS, OVERALL BUDGET, FIELD PORTION OF BUDGET, ALLOCATION OF COSTS TO COMMUNIST TARGETS VS INTERNAL TARGETS, RELATIONSHIP WITH LIAISON, ASSESSMENT OF GOVT. STABILITY AND INSURGENCY POTENTIAL, MEANS OF ACQUISITION OF SECRET INFORMATION, MOST IMPORTANT REPORTING OVER PAST YEAR, AMOUNT OF

MALAYSIAN INSURGENCY,

AND CONSTRAINTS OF COS SPENDING.

2. QUESTIONS WERE NOT PERSUED WITH MUCH VIGOR AND GROUP SEEMED NOT TOO DIFFICULT TO SATISFY. EXCEPTION WAS SNODGRASS, A YOUNG AGGRESSIVE STAFFER WHO OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO DELVE IN MORE DETAIL BUT WAS RESTRAINED BY TIME LIMITATIONS (THE

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ACTION #

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EIA799

PAGE 02-02

IN 790579

TOR:111013Z JAN 76

35661

CONGRESSMEN WERE HUNGRY AND WANTED TO GET OFF TO LUNCH).

3. THE DELEGATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CODEL RANDALL.

NONE HAD THE INTENSITY OR INTEREST OF REP MILFORD OR THE TOUGH
POLITICAL PERCEPTION OF REPS WILSON/DICKENSON. MR. CARY WAS QUITE
HELPFUL IN ORGANIZING THE GROUP AND PROVIDING CLUES TO THEIR
OUTLOOK.

4. OVERALL, BELIEVE DELEGATION WAS SATISFIED THOUGH THEY
PROBABLY DO NOT CONSIDER THIS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THEIR TRIP.
E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

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 DDO, SA/DDO, P/OLC

T 588800 EIA313 PAGE 01-01 IN 789314

TOR:091229Z JAN 76

[Redacted] 20992

SECRET 090033Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE [Redacted] 20992

TO: [Redacted] INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: [Redacted] 15837 (787572)

1. COS WILL TAKE MATTER UP WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASAP ARRIVAL [Redacted] AND ADVISE.

2. REGARDS. E2, IMPDET.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

15-2

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PAGE 01 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
082336Z DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
789926

CONF: *C/EA8* INFO: FILE *DCI Review Staff, CS/RF, DDO, SAT/DOO, D/OLC,*

INDEX DISSEM BY: *22*
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER *SOP*
 IP FILES # *112*

TO: PRIORITY [] INFO []

RYBAT PLMHCONGA 4

REF: [] 35600 | IN 787573* | 4

Mr. Waller copy

1. STATION APPEARS TO HAVE HANDLED VISIT OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IN FINE FASHION. REF WILL BE HELPFUL IN FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS HERE. 4

2. PARAGRAPH NINE, REFERENCE GIVES US SOME PROBLEMS. OBVIOUSLY, EVEN FACT THAT HE WAS BRIEFED BY CIA STATION CHIEF [] SENSITIVE SINCE THAT FACT ^{IF PUBLISHED} WILL CAUSE US EMBARRASSMENT

[] PLUS

CALLING UNWANTED ATTENTION TO STATION. []

[]

3. THEREFORE REQUEST STATION FORWARD "NON-CLASSIFIED" VERSION OF BRIEFING AND YOGA MEETING BY CABLE. HEADQUARTERS

DATE:
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UNIT:
EXT:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF:

INFO: FILE

DIRECTOR

789926

INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER
 IP FILES #

WILL HANDLE HERE WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SO THAT STATION
 OPERATIONS INCLUDING LIAISON EQUITIES ARE PROTECTED.4

4. [REDACTED] IF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAKES
 REQUEST FOR UNCLASSIFIED VERSIONS OF MEETING AND BRIEFINGS WITH/
 BY STATION AND LIAISON STATION SHOULD AGREE FORWARD TO HEADQUARTERS
 AND WE WILL HANDLE IN SIMILAR FASHION [REDACTED] E2, IMPDET.

d

OLC MR. WHITE {DRAFT}
 SA/DDO [REDACTED] {TELECOORD}
 CEA/PMI [REDACTED]

DATE: 8 JAN 76
 ORIG: [REDACTED]
 UNIT: DCEA
 EXT: 9373

William E. Nelson

WILLIAM E. NELSON DDO

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION

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COORDINATING OFFICERS


Theodore G. Shackley


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
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
E 2 IMPDET


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



























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RF FILE VR 20 (Review staff) 211F

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ACTION #

T 583972

EIA590

PAGE 01-01

IN 787506

TOR1072129Z JAN 76

20980

S E C R E T 072100Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE [] 20980

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: DIRECTOR 787555

1. APPOINTMENTS WITH LIAISON HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY
ARRANGED. CONG. MILFORD WILL MEET WITH []

2. COS [] DISCUSSIONS TENTATIVELY SET FOR
0830-1000. ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATE 30 MINUTES MEETING WITH
EACH LIAISON OFFICER, SO SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN AMPLE TIME
FOR MILFORD TO REJOIN GROUP FOR AFTERNOON ACTIVITIES. CAN
EXTEND DURATION OF MEETINGS IF HE DESIRES. E2, IMPDET,

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 44/40 PER SOP# 112 TOTAL COPIES 10-1 RUN BY CP

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DOO, CS/RF, SA/DOO, P/OLC

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T 584270

EIA882

PAGE 01

IN 787572

TOR:080012 JAN 76

15837

S E C R E T 070240Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE [] 15837

TO: [] INFO DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 787959

B. DIRECTOR 787555

*file
Senator travel*

PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD THAT COS [] CAN ARRANGE

15 JANUARY 0800 HOURS BREAKFAST MEETING []

AT CONGRESSMAN

MILFORD'S HOTEL. ALTHOUGH [] BRIEFINGS ON OPERATION

DEEPFREEZE SCHEDULED FOR MORNING OF 15 JAN. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAY

PREFER TO MEET WITH COS []

CONCURS WITH THIS ARRANGEMENT. TRANSPORTATION TO AIRPORT FOR

FLIGHT TO [] WILL BE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY AFTER MEETING WITH

[] PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PREFERENCE SO COS CAN

CONFIRM ABOVE ARRANGEMENT []

E2IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
022348Z DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
787954

CONF: *C/EA 3* INFO: FILE DCI *(REVIEW STAFF)*
DDD, CS/RF, SA/DOB

INDEX DISSEM BY 27
 NO INDEX
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 IP FILES # 112

TO: [Redacted]

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD Y

REF: DIRECTOR 787555 |*|

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES DESIRE MEETINGS WITH SENIOR LIAISON OFFICIALS. REQUEST STATION'S PROCEED TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS WITH LIAISON. E2, IMPDET.H


*TRANSMITTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S SCHEDULE.


OLC *Rel*
 CEA/PMI *H. G. Shackleford*


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 EXT: 9373


Shackley
 THEODORE G. SHACKLEY CEA


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































































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ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

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ACTION UNIT I N F O

RF. FILE VR DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CSRF, DDO, SA/DDO, JPLC

T 448045 EIA080 PAGE 01-01 IN. 736898

TOR:100349Z NOV 75 25761

SECRET 100322Z NOV 75 STAFF

CITE 25761

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: 25730 (IN 732789)

file under travelling Sects Congressman

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF

10 NOVEMBER 1975: QUOTE SUBJECT: LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. REF: 8531. 1. LETTER HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO MILFORD AS RECOMMENDED, ONLY CHANGE IN TEXT PROPOSED PARA 5 REFTER WAS DELETION OF FINAL SENTENCE. OWING TO SENSITIVITY OF REFERENCE TO "CLANDESTINE OPERATION" IN LETTER LIKELY TO BECOME PART OF PUBLIC RECORD. UNQUOTE;

* NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC.

10 NOV 75 13 48
SA/DDO

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4A PER SP 112 TOTAL COPIES 13-2 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED S E C R E T

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ACTION UNIT	I	RF	FILE	VR	DE, DDCI, DCI (REVIEW STAB)
ACTION #	N	DDO, CSRF, SA, DDO, DOLC	F		
	O				

T 424247 EIA337 PAGE 01 IN 728294

TOR: 310345Z OCT 75 25687

S E C R E T 310314Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE 25687

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: 25649

*(724591) **

*Send to
CNSA/DCI
travel
file*

31 OCT 75 08 39

1. REGRET DELAY IN REPORTING FOLLOWUP DISCUSSION WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. HE MET WITH COS FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR MORNING OF 28 OCTOBER PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. DCOS BROUGHT THE CONGRESSMAN TO COS RESIDENCE AND THEN EXCUSED HIMSELF TO MEET WITH CONGRESSMAN LUCIEN NEDZ [REDACTED]

2. AS IT TURNED OUT NOTHING OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE DEVELOPED AT THIS MEETING. * R SPROVIDED BOTH AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW VARIOUS POINTS DISCUSSED IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION WITH COS EMPHASIZING THE [REDACTED] COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS PLUS THE MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE AND COST EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PROCEDURES.

3. COS PERMITTED THE CONGRESSMAN TO READ A STERILIZED COPY OF [REDACTED] THE FINAL PARAGRAPH AND THEN DISCUSSED HIS PROPOSAL TO TRY TO DEVELOP A MINORITY REPORT AROUND THIS TYPE *WAGE OR WE 41* I-83 94 23 78B REVIEW

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2 /75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY _____ PER _____ TOTAL COPIES _____ RUN BY _____

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED _____ **S E C R E T**

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ACTION #		

T 424247 EIA337 PAGE 02-02 IN 728294

TOR:310345Z OCT 75

25687


STUDY AND EXPLAINED WHY DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WAS FEASIBLE. THE CONGRESSMAN CONCURRED BUT RESTATED HIS DESIRE TO NOW FOLLOW UP HIS [] INQUIRIES AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL AND SOMEHOW INCORPORATE VARIOUS ASPECTS INTO HIS REPORT. HE REINTERATED HIS STRONG DESIRE TO MEET WITH [] COMMENDED MR. SHACKLEY TO THE CONGRESSMAN FOR SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS ON THIS AREA.


4. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS QUITE PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE OF THE DISCUSSIONS HERE AND WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL. HIS PROBLEM REMAINS ONE OF FOCUS AND STAFF ASSISTANCE. E2, IMPDET.


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
* Bonus SRC'D


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






















































OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
220018Z
CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
760703

CONF: C/LA3 INFO: FILE DCI (REVIEW STAFF), CS/RF,
 DDO, DDC/DD, SA/DDO

INDEX DISSEM BY: 45
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER SOP
 IP FILES # 112

TO: [Redacted]

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

REF: [Redacted] 34339 | IN 72135 | Y

1. HQS AWARE OF AND HANDLING REF CASE. NO NEED FORWARD WALKER LETTER AND OTHER THAN POUCHING COPIES OF MEMOS. NO FURTHER STATION ACTION NECESSARY AT THIS TIME. PLS ADVISE BY CABLE IF ANY FURTHER INFO THIS MATTER COMES TO STATION ATTENTION. Y

2. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET. H

Oct 29 3 5

[Redacted]

SA/DDO - [Redacted] (TELECOORD)

DATE: 28 OCT 75
 ORIG: [Redacted]
 UNIT: C/LA/CAM/PA
 1805

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/CAM AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054524

OUTGOING MESSAGE

9-1

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CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
242332Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
759842

CONF: C/EA 3 INFO: FILE DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF
 DDO, DDO/DO SA/DDP

INDEX DISSEM BY: J
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER SOP 112

TO: PRIORITY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

RYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA Y
 REF: DIRECTOR 759843 Y

1. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ALL CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST BEAR THE SENSITIVITY INDICATOR RYBAT AND THE CRYPTONYM [REDACTED] PLMHCONGA. Y
2. FOR UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE CASES, CHIEFS OF STATION MAY AT THEIR DISCRETION USE THE [REDACTED] {PLMPTACT} [REDACTED] CHANNEL. Y
3. ALL INFORMATION RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST REPEAT MUST BE SENT TO HQS VIA CABLE REPEAT CABLE. E2, IMPDET.H

CEA/OEM: [REDACTED] {IN DRAFT}
 EA/DDO: [REDACTED] TELECOORD}

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975
 ORIG: CEA/ESEC
 UNIT: [REDACTED]
 EXT: 1709

Theodore G. Shackley
 THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA
 RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
 CL BY: 005088

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR STAFF DATE-TIME GROUP 242332Z CITE DIRECTOR MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 759843

CONF: *C/EA 3* INFO: FILE *DCI/RENEW STAFF CS/RF*
DDO, DDO/DO, SAT/DDO
 INDEX DISSEM BY: *J*
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER *Sop*
 # *117*

TO: PRIORITY

RYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA Y

REF: DIRECTOR 759842 Y

- 1. IDENTITY IS: CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE AGENCY.
- 2. NO FILE. E2, IMPDET.H

CEA/OEM: {IN DRAFT}
 EA/DDO: TELECOORD}

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975
 ORIG: CEA/ESEC

EXT: 1709

Theodore G. Shackley
 THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
 CL BY: 005088

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CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

241922Z

CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

759641

CONF: *C/EA3*

INFO: FILE *DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CSRF, 200, 200/00, SA/DDP, 0/010*

INDEX DISSEM BY: *C*

NO INDEX

RETURN TO PER *SA*

IP FILES # *112*

IMMEDIATE

[Redacted]

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

REF: A. [Redacted] 25645 | IN 722803 |

B. [Redacted] 25646 | IN 723138 | Y

1. IN VIEW OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S INTENTION AS EXPRESSED IN REF A TO SPEND ONE IF NOT SEVERAL DAYS IN DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES, BELIEVE [Redacted] STATION SHOULD APPROACH THIS TASK WITH FOLLOWING DATA IN MIND: Y

A. BACKGROUND. HOUSE COMMITTEE IN ITS ENTIRETY IS KEENLY INTERESTED IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOW CIA FUNCTIONS. IT MOST LIKELY CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WILL BE FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT [Redacted]

B. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE. BELIEVE MUCH OF WHAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD CALLS "START OF THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROCESS IN THE FIELD" CAN BE DEALT WITH IF STATION STARTS ITS BRIEFING WITH PRESENTATION ON HOW MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS. SUGGEST STATION OUTLINE

DATE: 24 OCT 75

ORIG: TGSHACKLEY:DCM

UNIT: C/EA

EXT: 1428

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 061991

S E C R E T

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CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: FILE

759641

- INDEX DISSEM BY:
- NO INDEX
- RETURN TO PER
- IP FILES #

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE PROCESS I.E., STATION RECEIVES OD FROM HQS AND COMMENTS ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AG'S WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL [REDACTED] TO FOCUS ON KEY OBJECTIVE IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW DISCUSSION DOWN TO AG-4 OR AG-7. THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD INCLUDE COMMENTARY ON FUNDING BY FAN'S, ETC. 4

C. AGENT ACQUISITION. WITH FOCUS OF BRIEFING BEING ON AG-4 OR AG-7, STATION COULD THEN OUTLINE HOW TARGET STUDIES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES ^{ARE} CONDUCTED, POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED AND HOW SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS. IN DISCUSSION OF RECRUITMENT PHASE OF OPERATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE EXAMINATION OF NAME TRACE AND POA PROCESS. 4

D. AGENT AUTHENTICATION. DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESSMAN SHOULD ALSO OUTLINE HOW AGENT AUTHENTICATED ONCE RECRUITED. STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTICATION, SECURITY OF MEETINGS, ETC. 4

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 061991

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CLASSIFICATION

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DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

DIRECTOR

175964/1

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

- INDEX DISSEM BY:
- NO INDEX
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- IP FILES #

E. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION. ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT, TURNING IT INTO INTEL DISSEMINATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM, AND REPORTS EVALUATION CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED. Y

F. OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM. STARTING WITH RECRUITMENT OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED BY AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E., PRQ PART I AND 2, CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS, PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS, PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND FIELD PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER, STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON ^{FEED BACK} ~~FEED BACK~~ FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON. Y

G. CASE HISTORY. IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY ACTIVE SOURCES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. IN VIEW OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO UNDERSCORE ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

759641

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
 0 NO INDEX
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 0 IP FILES #

PROTECTION. THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS AND ASSUME IT WILL BE USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR [] Y

2. BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO ZERO IN ON STATION'S COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCID'S FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPS. ALSO THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE PART OF BRIEFING CONCENTRATE ON IMMINENCE OF HOSTILITIES INDICATORS WHICH NOW BEING WORKED ON BY AMERICAN INTEL COMMUNITY IN CONSULTATION WITH [] THIS MIGHT WELL SHOW COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES INVOLVED IN MEASURING INTEL SUCCESS OR FAILURES. Y

3. HQS HAS HAD LIMITED EXPOSURE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, THUS UNABLE TO SHED ANY LIGHT ON QUESTION POSED IN REF B PARA 2. BASIC GUIDELINE FOR THIS BRIEFING MUST BE FULL CANDOR WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY PROTECTING SOURCES AND METHODS. Y

4. PLEASE USE ABOVE INDICATORS ON FUTURE TRAFFIC DEALING WITH BRIEFINGS OR TRAVELS OF CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS WHO INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATION OF INTEL COMMUNITY. E-2, IMPDET.H

AC/EA/JK [Signature]
 DC/EA [Signature]
 C/EA/COPS [Signature]
 A/DDO [Signature]
 C/REVIEW STAFF [Signature]
 C/OLC [Signature]

DATE: 24 OCT 75
 ORIG: TGS Shackley:DCM
 UNIT: C/EA
 EXT: 1428

DDO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[Signature]
 THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, C/EA
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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E 2 IMPDET

SECRET

CL BY: 061991

Senator's Travel File

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RF FILE VR DCI (REVIEW STAFF), CSRF,
 DDO, SADD, DPLC

T 408492 EIA951 PAGE 01 IN 722803

TOR:240650Z OCT 75

25645

SECRET 240620Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE [] 25645

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR;

NIACT DIRECTOR

RYBAT CODEL

REF: A. DIRECTOR 758492

B. DIRECTOR 758427

1. CODEL MURPHY ARRIVED [] EVENING 23 OCTOBER

[] DUE HOSPITALIZATION OF COS, DCOS

CONTACTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD AND OFFERED SEPARATE

BRIEFING IF DESIRED. IN BRIEF CONVERSATION []

[] ON MORNING OF 24 OCTOBER IN

WHICH DCOS PARTICIPATED, REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD REITERATED

POINTS COVERED IN REFERENT A MESSAGE AND STATED HE HAD

BEEN CHARGED BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN TO MAKE A

DETAILED STUDY OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS IN THE FIELD.

HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BREAK OFF FROM DELEGATION

SCHEDULE AS OF 0900 OCTOBER 25 TO COMMENCE DISCUSSIONS.

WHILE PARAMETERS OF HIS^S INTERESTS NOT FULLY COVERED IN

INITIAL CONVERSATION, HE ANTICIPATES DEVOTING ONE^S/F NOT

SECRET

TABLE SEC DISSEM BY

PLN

TOTAL COPIES

RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON LINE NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT

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RF FILE VR

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ACTION #

T 408492

EIA951

PAGE 02-02

IN 722803

TOR:240650Z OCT 75

25645

SEVERAL DAYS TO DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES.

2. REP. LUCIEN NEDZI WAS ALSO CONTACTED WITH OFFER OF STATION BRIEFING WHICH WAS RECEIVED IN FRIENDLY FASHION. REP. NEDZI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH LATER DURING THEIR FIVE DAY STAY.

3. COS MAY BE RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL MORNING OF 25 OCTOBER. WHETHER HE IS OR NOT, COS PREPARED TO TALK WITH REP. MILFORD EITHER AT HOSPITAL OR AT RESIDENCE WHERE HE WILL NEED BE CONFINED FOR ONE WEEK RECOVERY. THIS OFFER BEING CONVEYED TO CONGRESSMAN, AND IF AGREEABLE TO HIM, ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR HIM TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH COS.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE BY 0800 LOCAL 25 OCTOBER AS REP. MILFORD'S INTERESTS OBVIOUSLY EXTEND TO DETAILED PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS BEYOND NORMAL SCOPE OF FIELD BRIEFINGS.

E2 IMPDET



SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
 AGE COI ACP TOG TPE PRO DCI
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PAGE OF PAGES
 1 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
 STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP CITE
 231741Z DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
 758926

CONF: *C/NE-3* INFO: FILE *DCI/REVIEW STAFF, c/rf, DDO, DDO/DO, SA/DO*

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: *[Signature]*
 0 NO INDEX
 0 RETURN TO PER *[Signature]*

TO:

ADMIN 4

1. ALL SIGNIFICANT CABLE TRAFFIC RELATING TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF CIA SHOULD CARRY IDEN SLUG.4
2. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY ADDRESSEES MAY USE PLARGYLE RATHER THAN IDEN SLUG. IN SUCH INSTANCES, NE DIVISION WILL ASSURE THAT APPROPRIATE HQS COMPONENTS ARE APPRISED OF PERTINENT PORTIONS OF THOSE MESSAGES. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975
 ORIG:
 UNIT: NE/COPS
 EXT: R-1562

[Signature]
 C/NE
 RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

NE/COPS
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
 CL BY: 056382

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
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 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
 MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
 DATE-TIME GROUP: 231741Z
 CITE: DIRECTOR
 MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 758927
 INDEX: DISSEM BY: *[Signature]*
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 RETURN TO: PER: *[Signature]*
 PAGE OF PAGES: 1 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: *C/NE-3*

INFO: FILE *DCI/RENEW STAFF, CC/RF*
DDO, DDO/DO, SA/DDO

INDEX DISSEM BY *[Signature]*
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER *[Signature]*

TO:

ADMIN 4

REF: DIRECTOR 758926

IDEN: PLMHCONGA E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975
ORIG:
UNIT: NE/COPS
EXT: R-1562

[Signature]
C/NE
RELASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

NE/COPS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 056382

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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3		6		9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
 AL 5 COI ALP TUG TRF MRO DCI

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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
 212340Z

CITE
 DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
 758104

CONF: C/EUR 3 INFO: FILE DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF, SA/DDO

INDEX DISSEM BY: *J*
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER *Sep*
 IP FILES # *112*

TO: [Redacted]

RYBAT PLMHCONGA 4

FOR ACOS AND [Redacted] 4

1. HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE PLANS HOLD HEARINGS ON DESTRY PROJECT 29 OCTOBER. REQUEST [Redacted] PLAN REVIEW PLDEFINE MATERIAL WITH CHIEF EUROPE ON 27 OCTOBER AND ARRANGE BE HEADQUARTERS NOT LATER THAN AFTERNOON 28 OCTOBER. 4

2. PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC RELATED TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLKMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC AT YOUR DISCRETION. E2, IMPDET.H

File

21 OCTOBER 1975

DATE: [Redacted]
 ORIG: DC/EUR
 UNIT: 1283

[Redacted]

SA/DDO CIN DRAFT

DC/EUR CIN DRAFT

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
 CL BY:

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 CLASSIFICATION

SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 211745Z DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 757742

CONF: C/EUR INFO: FILE DCI (REVIEW STAFF),
 CS/RF, DDO, SA/DDO.

INDEX DISSEM BY: 28
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER DDO
 IP FILES # MEMO

TO: [Redacted]

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR REPORTING ON VISIT MR. DAVID AARON.
 PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC RELATED
 TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES OF
 UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLKMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC
 AT YOUR DISCRETION. E2 IMPDET.H

[Handwritten signature]

DATE: 21 OCTOBER 75

[Redacted box]

[Redacted box]

DC/EUR

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 012860

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ROUTING SHEET

TO:

	ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIALS
1 DDO				
2 ADDO				
3 C/PLANS				
4 C/OPS				
5 C/SS				
6 C/CCS				
7 C/CI				
8 C/AF				
9 C/DCD				
10 C/DIVD				
11 C/EA				
12 C/EUR				
13 C/FR				
14 C/NE				
15 C/SE				
16 C/LA				
17 SA/DDO CT-5				

10 NOV 1975

SUSPENSE DATE

REMARKS

File

Senator Church?

17 OCT 75 13 49

SIGNATURE

SA / ADDO

DATE

17 OCT 1975

17 OCT 1975

75-5707

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs

SUBJECT : The Director's Greeting Card List

1. It is requested that you provide recommendations as to whom the Director should send holiday greetings. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO in Room 7E22 by the close of business 10 November 1975.

2. Your list should be prepared on a very selected basis. You may include the names of chiefs of foreign security and intelligence services and the names of non-intelligence personnel abroad who are of special interest or significance to the Agency mission. In most cases, these names should be those of persons whom the Director has met here or abroad.

3. After the Director has reviewed the lists of recommended names, the greeting cards will be prepared and sent to the appropriate Division or Staff for pouching or mailing.

SA/ADDO

Distribution:

C/AF

C/EA

C/EUR

C/DCD

C/DIVD

C/FR

C/LA/

C/NE

C/SE

C/CCS

C/CI

C/OPS

C/PS

C/SS

SA/DDO

SPG/DDO

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 037796

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

17 OCT 1975

L 170 75-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs

SUBJECT : DDCI's Greeting Card List

Addressees are requested to prepare a Christmas card list for the DDCI. It should include, where security permits, all significant contacts hosted by him at Headquarters or visited in the field. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO by close of business 10 November 1975.


SA/ADDO

Distribution:

C/AF	C/SE
C/EA	C/CCS
C/EUR	C/CI
C/DCD	C/OPS
C/DIVD	C/PS
C/FR	C/SS
C/LA	SA/DDO
C/NE	SPG/DDO

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 037796

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SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

DC/EUR

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS	
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	<i>Joan</i>																		file in "Senatorial trip file in my safe"


17 OCT 75 13 12


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
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
INTERNAL USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED









UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ROUTING SHEET

TO:	ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIALS
1. DDO				
2. ADDO				
3. C/PLANS				
4. C/OPS				
5. C/SS				
6. C/CS				
7. C/CT				
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9. C/CD				
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12. C/EDR				
13. C/FRS				
14. C/NE				
15. C/SE				
16. C/LA				
17. SA/DDO: McWalter				
18. CT-5				
19.				
20.				

EXPIRES DATE

17 OCT 75 16 16
 in my hand
 SA/DDO
 McWalter

SIGNATURE: EA/DDO
 DATE: 17 OCT. 75

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ROUTING SHEET

TO:

	ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIALS
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4 C/OPS				
5 C/SS				
6 C/CCS				
7 C/CI				
8 C/AF				
9 C/DCD				
10 C/DIVD				
11 C/EA				
12 C/EUR				
13 C/FR				
14 C/NE				
15 C/SE				
16 C/LA				
⑰ SA/DDO Mr. Walker CT-5				

SUSPENSE DATE _____

REMARKS:

17 OCT 75 16 16


file in my Senators travel file


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
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
EA/DDO

17 Oct. 75











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- "EYES ONLY" -

085988 EIA898 PAGE 01 IN 725701

TOR:161514Z OCT 75

43369

SECRET 161302Z OCT 75 STAFF

*Recommend dissemination to D/OLC & DCI (Review)

CITE [] 43369

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLKMSALL

1. MR. AARON MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AT LUNCHEON 15 OCTOBER. SAID HE WAS STAFF EMPLOYEE OF SENATOR MONSDALE AND WAS HEAD OF SELECT COMMITTEE TASK FORCE FORMERLY CALLED WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE BUT RENAMED COMMAND AND CONTROL TASK FORCE. MR. AARON SAID HE FELT COMMITTEE WOULD CONCLUDE ITS WORK IN FEBRUARY AS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED.

2. AARON SAID IT HIS OPINION THAT AS CONCERNED WRONGDOINGS CIA'S RECORD WAS PROBABLY BETTER THAN SOME OF THE OTHER INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. HE MENTIONED THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION IN THIS CONTEXT. HE SAID IF WE FELT THAT CIA HAVING DIFFICULT TIME WITH CHURCH COMMITTEE WE SHOULD WAIT AND SEE WHAT HAPPENS TO FBI WHO WERE "GOING TO HAVE THEIR CLOCKS CLEANED." SAID FBI HAD GONE 50 YEARS WITHOUT REVISION AND VAST AMOUNT OF WRONGDOING HAD RESULTED FROM THIS SITUATION.

3. ALSO OF INTEREST, []

[] WHO WAS PRESENT DURING AARON'S SESSIONS WITH ARMY

ABLE SEC DISSEM BY _____ PER _____ TOTAL COPIES _____ RUN BY _____

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED _____

S E C R E T

VANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED _____

BY _____ AT _____ Z _____

STAFF

LOCATION UNIT

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LOCATION #

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EIA898

PAGE 02-02


IN 715761

TOR:161514Z OCT 75

43369

COMPONENTS, INFORMED US 15 OCTOBER THAT HIS IMPRESSION BASED ON
TALKS WITH MR. AARON, LATTER WOULD LIKE SEE CIA TAKE OVER POSITIVE
COLLECTION ELEMENT OF THE [] MR. AARON MADE SIMILAR
COMMENTS TO US, AS WE REPORTING SEPARATELY. E2 IMPDET.







6.02875 1658

Review Staff: 75/3149/aDate 6 October 1975*Marge File*

TO : CIA Task Force
 FROM : The Review Staff, Walter Elder
 SUBJECT : SSC/HSC Request
 RECEIVED: Date 3 October Time 1905

The attached letter requests an orientation briefing for David Aaron who is travelling again this time to

Comments:

*1st Meeting - Briefing
 on 8 Oct 1975 by Det. L. A. Fendig
 2nd Briefing - 10 Oct 75 by Fendig*

	Action	Info
SC/DCI		X
A/DDA		X
A/DDI		X
A/DDO	<i>SHG</i>	
A/DDS&T		X
OGC		X
OLC		X
IG		X
B. Evans		X
SA/DDO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	

REVIEW STAFF
75-3149

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 5, 1975

[Redacted]

Assistant to the Director
Room 6D0120
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Bolten:

This letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to [Redacted] which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month.

[Large Redacted Area]

Sincerely,

Bill

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department

Oct 3 7 05 PM '75

FRANK RUSSELL, IDAHO, C
 JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE
 PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
 WALTER F. MONDALE, MASS.
 WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
 ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
 GARY HART, COLO.
 HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
 BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
 CHARLES MCC. MATTHIAS, JR., MD.
 RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
 WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
 FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
 CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
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 RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 3, 1975


REVIEW STAFF
 75-3150

Mr. William G. Hyland
 Director
 Bureau of Intelligence and Research
 Department of State
 Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Hyland:

This letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month.

Although the plans are not yet precise, it is expected that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October 16 and 17.



Sincerely,

William G. Miller

copy to CIA

Oct 3 7 05 PM '75

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CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

John Walker
2B-1415

EXTENSION

9135
~~*9018*~~

NO.

DATE

26 September 1975

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

Mr. Rogers

10/6

WC

2.


John Walker
File


Notes:
Attached is
worth reading.
I report on a
trip of Daniel
Laron and Bill
Trichard (both ssc)
to Latin America.
Notes page 18,
BRIL 24723.


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
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
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




























































































*File under
SSC travel*

S E C R E T

20 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LA Division

SUBJECT : Transmittal of SSC Memo Announcing
the Intention of SSC Staffers to
Visit Latin America

1. Attached is a xerox of a letter from the SSC Staff Director (Review Staff 75-2399) describing travel plans to Latin America on the part of SSC Staffers. This is for your information. You will be alerted when this becomes firm and an itinerary is established.

2. Also attached is an agreed upon memo giving guidelines of such trips. Supplementing this should be a briefing of the travelling of SSC Staffers before they go and a notification of the stations involved as to what the guidelines are.

John H. Waller
SA/DDO

Attachment
As stated above

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att
2 - SA/DDO

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 055636

S E C R E T

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and
Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.

I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions

4/25/75

that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public exposure of such relationships. To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.

III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms--operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.

IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES
WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.

VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized.

BURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
 JOYER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
 HOWARD M. BAKER, JR., TENN.
 BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
 CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
 RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
 WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
 FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
 CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

file

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
 STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
 RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
 (PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 12, 1975

REVIEW STAFF
 75-2399

[Redacted]

Assistant to the Director
 Room 6D0120
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Langley, Virginia

*Done: C/LA + 3 LA officers
 completed briefing
 on 17 Sept 1975
 mdy*

Dear Mr. [Redacted]

This letter is to confirm an oral request by Committee staff
 for an orientation briefing for a visit to South America which two
 members of the staff, David Aaron and William Trueheart, have been
 asked to make next month.

Although plans are not yet firm, it is expected that they will
 be free to travel during the second and third weeks of September.

[Redacted]

Messrs. Aaron and Trueheart are not expected to consult with
 officials of the host government and, so far as the Committee is
 concerned, the latter need not be informed of the visit.

Sincerely yours,

Bell

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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TO: PRIORITY []

REF: STATE 137637, 30 JUNE 1975 Y

DHB ✓

1. SENATOR TOWER, MEMBER OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (ASC) AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING CIA, IS TRAVELING IN EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND ^{ITH} AIR FORCE ESCORT. [] HAS ADVISED THAT SENATOR TOWER WILL BE IN [] 3-7 JULY WHERE HE WILL CALL ON []

R 2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELING ON ASC BUSINESS, SENATOR TOWER MAY TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE ACTIVITY [] IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING, STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HIM WITH ONE. YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL INTEL EXCHANGE WITH THE [] BUT SEE NO NEED TO TOUCH ON ANY JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND [] CONTACTS.

3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, IN THE EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HQS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDLINES FOR

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ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HQS IS ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE^{IV}, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY, AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 2 JULY 1975
ORIG: [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]

{TELECOORD}
SA/DDO - WALLER IN SUBSTANCE
OLC - MILLER R. CHAN

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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TO: IMMEDIATE

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DAB -

1. AS YOU AWARE, IN ADDITION TO BEING A MEMBER OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (ASC) SENATOR TOWER IS VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING CIA. SENATOR TOWER IS TRAVELLING TO EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND WITH AIR FORCE ESCORT. WE HAVE NOT DETERMINED HIS DETAILED ITINERARY BUT WILL ADVISE YOU AS APPROPRIATE WHEN WE DO. 4

2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELLING ON ASC BUSINESS SENATOR TOWER MAY WELL TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE ACTIVITY IN [] SHOULD HE DO SO, THIS ASPECT OF HIS VISIT SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICIZED, BUT, IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING, THE STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HIM WITH ONE. YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL LIAISON EXCHANGE

[] OMITTING THE DETAILS INVOLVED WITH OUR INTEL EXCHANGE AND JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. THE STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER TO ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND ITS [] CONTACTS.

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THE COS WILL PROBABLY WISH TO MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY BRIEFING SENATOR TOWER MAY REQUEST. 4

3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, ^{IN THE} EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HQS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS

IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HQS IS ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. E2 IMPDET.H

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EXT: 1582 *walter*

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in draft

to Miller

WILLIE HILLER

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

C/SS/CAG 3D0004

EXTENSION NO.

R9125

DATE

28 July 1975

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Mr. John Waller
SA/DDO 2B1415

29 JUL 1975

*ONLY Allowed to
Review with DIRECTOR*

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
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
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
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
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
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22 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Waller
Special Assistant to DDO

SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations
Against Right-Wing Governments

REFERENCE: SS/CAG Memorandum of 18 July 1975,
Same Subject

We have reviewed referent memorandum and have the following comments on those paragraphs which concern

13. [] While this case is somewhat bizarre and does not represent a productive operation, we pose no objection to its being presented to the Senate Select Committee.

14. [] We have no objection to the presentation of these programs to the Senate Select Committee for review although we share concern expressed by SS/CAG that a leak of this information would be detrimental to the base negotiations.

s/gwb/William W. Wells

William W. Wells
Chief, European Division


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
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
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July 20

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select
Committee and Their Staffs While
Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:

- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to a host government.

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In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

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No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

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TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

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1. IN MEETING WITH COS ON 30 JUNE, [] TOLD COS THAT HE HAD LUNCH WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE AND ENGAGED IN BRIEF GENERAL DISCUSSION OF INVESTIGATION OF BKERHALD BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. [] FOUND SENATOR MONDALE ENTIRELY REASONABLE IN HIS APPROUACH AND FULLY AWARE OF DIFFICULTY OF JUDGING EVENTS AND DECISIONS OF EARLY 1960'S BY STANDARDS OF 1975.

2. [] SENATOR MONDALE STATED THAT HE HAD MADE SOME EFFORT TO CONTACT [] ON JUNE 28 WITHOUT SUCCESS. IN LIGHT OF REF, COS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO CONTACT SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE. IN CONVERSATION WITH COS ON 30 JUNE,

[]

IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK FORWARDED REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE TO MEET [] ON 30 JUNE. SINCE [] HAD TO BE IN PARIS ON 28 JUNE AND [] HAD NOT YET RETURNED FROM HIS ASIAN

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MAY 1974

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IN 620738

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TRIP, [] WASHINGTON WAS ASKED TO INFORM MONDALE
 THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME. THIS IS FOR
 YOUR BACKGROUND IN EVENT SENATOR RAISES THE POINT WITH HQS.
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T 121509

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PAGE 01

IN 619528

TOR1271651Z JUN 75

41001

SECRET 271217Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE [] 41001

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

FROM []

REF DIRECTOR 708791

1. IT WILL GREATLY FACILITATE PLANNING SCHEDULE FOR SENATOR MONDALE IF A MORE SPECIFIC ITINERARY CAN BE OBTAINED TOGETHER WITH SOME INDICATION OF HOW MUCH TIME THE SENATOR PLANS TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO US DURING HIS [] VISIT. IN VIEW OF THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE [] GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ARE NOT CENTRALLY LOCATED IN ONE PLACE, PLUS []

[] I AM GIVING THOUGHT TO HAVING CHIEFS OF BASE [] PARTICIPATE BUT AS OF PRESENT TIME WE UNCERTAIN EVEN WHAT DAY SENATOR WILL ACTUALLY BE IN []

2. WE ALSO PERPLEXED BY PARA 6 REF RE "SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT WITH THE [] AS HQS AWARE []

[] WE ARE EQUALLY PUZZLED BY THE COMMENT IN PARA 7 ABOUT 'SEEING THE [] FACILITY' WHICH SEEMS TO SUGGEST RESURGENCE OF LONG-STANDING MISCONCEPTION THAT [] IS A

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EIA815

PAGE 02-02

IN 619528

TOR:271651Z JUN 75

41001

PHYSICAL FACILITY HOUSING [REDACTED] THERE
IS NO [REDACTED] FACILITY AS SUCH, JUST A FEW SAFE APARTMENTS
[REDACTED] AND I PLAN TO BRIEF THE SENATOR ON [REDACTED]
ACTIVITIES AS PART OF THE [REDACTED] PRESENTATION. IF THE SENATOR
PLANS TO VISIT ANY OTHER LOCATION [REDACTED] IN
ADDITION [REDACTED] WE URGENTLY REQUEST EARLY ADVICE THEREOF.

3. ASSUME SENATOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN GENERAL TERMS AT LEAST
ON AGENCY PROCEDURES FOR TRACING AND CLEARING OPERATIONAL SOURCES,
REPORTING ON THEIR ACTIVITIES, AND AGENCY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
PROCEDURES, BUT WOULD PLAN USE THESE PROCEDURES AS FRAMEWORK
IN DESCRIBING EXERCISE OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN THE FIELD,
IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR AREAS
OF STATION OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY.

4. WILL GREATLY APPRECIATE ETA OF SENATOR AND PARTY [REDACTED]
AS SOON AS THIS CAN POSSIBLY BE PROCURED. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

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T 120565 EIA892 PAGE 01 IN 619109

TOR:271119Z JUN 75

62823

SECRET 271112Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE [] 62823

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF A. DIRECTOR 708791

B. STATE 146723 DTD 21 JUNE (AC*)

C. STATE 150884 DTD 26 JUNE (AC*)

1. WE NOTE CHANGES IN SENATOR MONDALE TRIP.

2. REFS B & C INDICATE MONDALE ARRIVING [] 28 JUNE DEPARTING 29TH, TRAVELLING [] THEN RETURNING TO WASHINGTON

[] ON 7 JULY. NO MENTION OF OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY EXCEPT MRS. MONDALE. REALIZE INFO MAY BE COVER FOR TRIP, BUT WOULD LIKE CLARIFICATION. DOES SENATOR EXPECT BRIEFINGS

[] ON 28TH VICE 30 JUNE AND 1 JULY?

3. PLS ADVISE. E2 IMPDET

* NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
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252225Z

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DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

711716

CONF: C/EUR

INFO: FILE C/IA/AN, DDO/DO,
OLC, CLASS 3, C/PS/EG2,
C/C/OP3

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- IP FILES #

TO: [Redacted]

RYBAT 4

- REFS: A. [Redacted] 62701 | IN 616087 |
B. [Redacted] 62615 | IN 613590 | 4

DHB ✓
JW copy sent

AS YET WE HAVE NOT HEARD FURTHER ON THE MONDALE VISIT NOR HAS EUR DIVISION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF ANY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CODEL. IN ANSWER TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS, WE HAVE ALREADY FORWARDED [Redacted] BY SEPARATE CHANNEL THE CLEARANCE STATUS OF THE PARTY. WE HAVE QUERIED ABOUT THE SENATOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE AGEE CASE, BUT KNOW OF NO SPECIAL BRIEFING GIVEN HIM. WE PRESUME HE HAS READ THE NEWSPAPERS. SHOULD THE SUBJECT ARISE, WE ARE PREPARED TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS FORTHRIGHTLY. RATHER THAN DISCUSSING SPECIFIC COVERT ACTION PROJECTS AND DIVULGING SOURCE NAMES, YOU SHOULD COVER THE GENERAL IDEAS BEHIND COVERT ACTION ACTIVITIES, THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY WERE DEVELOPED AND WHY THEY WERE TERMINATED. E2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 25 JUNE 1975
ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS
UNIT: C/EUR
EXT: 1012

h. w. wells
WILLIAM W. WELLS, C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

John Waller
JOHN WALLER, SA/DDO
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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T 112809 EIA332 PAGE 01 IN 616087
TORI241622Z JUN 75 62701

SECRET 241451Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE [] 62701

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

REF A, DIRECTOR 708791

R B, [] 62615 (013590)

1. RE PARA 5 REF A, []

INFORMED COS AT LUNCH 24 JUNE THAT AS RESULT OF REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE []

[] ARE TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO MEET WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 1 JULY TO DISCUSS BOTH HOW POLICY CONTROL IS EXERCISED OVER []

2. [] MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE AND [] WERE THE ONLY ONES AUTHORIZED TO DEAL WITH SENATOR MONDALE AND THAT SENATOR MONDALE WILL NOT BE MEETING WITH []

REPS,

3. WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY TO GUIDANCE REQUEST IN REF B.

E2 IMPDET

WEN
DHB
JW

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Review Staff: 75/1009
24 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Senator Gary Hart's Request to Talk
to QJWIN While Traveling in Europe

This is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent while the senator is traveling in Europe.

The agent is QJWIN. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On the weekend of 7 June 1975, members of the Senate Select Committee staff spent many hours at Headquarters reading files, including QJWIN and ZRRIFLE, among others. QJWIN's true name contract is in the file which they read. So is a street and post office address as of 1964, the time when we ended our contract with this agent. We have not contacted him since.

We have heard that David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff telephoned QJWIN. This report remains unconfirmed. We have protested to Bill Miller.

It is difficult to imagine how a U.S. senator could talk to a former agent without arousing the interest of the local intelligence service [REDACTED] and of the host government who might wonder about the propriety of investigations being conducted on their territory and involving one of their citizens.

In any event, an approach of this nature would be of interest to the Department of State, and the senator might wish to consult with the Department before proceeding.

Walter Elder
Walter Elder

CB: 007789
E2 IMPDET

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Talking Points For Use With Senator Gary Hart On His Proposed
Contact With QJWYN

1. Senatorial contact with a former CIA agent would run the risk of his exposure to his local government and the press. Because of his former activities and relationships he might be subjected to reprisals from abroad, possible prosecution for espionage at home from his local government and harassment from the media.
2. Active as well as former CIA agents abroad would have further cause to believe that the American intelligence service is incapable of protecting its informants from disclosure. Contacting an agent under the insecure conditions involved would violate the Agency's promise to this former informant to protect the confidentiality of the relationship.
3. Foreign intelligence services with which the CIA is in liaison would find this approach highly unprofessional and risky. It is bound to raise further questions about the dangers of continued confidential cooperation with the CIA.
4. It is possible that the local government involved might lodge a formal protest to the US mission protesting the unusual procedure of a Senate investigating committee interrogating its nationals in violation of its sovereignty without requesting formal permission.

6/24/75

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Review Staff: 75/868
20 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

This is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent of ours while traveling in Europe.

You should know that we have been told that the Senate Select Committee staff has already been in touch with this agent by telephone. We do not know how they learned his true name or his whereabouts. We have already advised David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff of a potential problem area in connection with such a proposed meeting. The agent in question is, of course, a subject of interest to the local intelligence service and we doubt that the host government or the intelligence service would agree that a United States senator, especially a member of the Senate Select Committee, may appropriately conduct such investigations within its territory without clearance to do so.

In any event, an approach of this nature would be of interest and indeed of concern to the Department of State and the senator might be well advised to consult with them before proceeding.

For your information, the agent referred to is QJWIN and we have not been in touch with him since about 1951.

14/
Walter Elder

EB

CB: 007789
E2 IMPDET

SECRET

*Elder handcarried
orig to DCI.*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

6/25 DDO *[initials]*
ADDO *[initials]*
SA/ODD - *[initials]* ←

DCI

More facts, per your request, on the QJWIN matter.

Talking points for your use with Sen. Gary Hart are included.

H. Knoche

6-24-75
(DATE)

PROPOSED DOD
CHANGES SHOWN
HERE, PP 2 and 5,
WITHIN THE HEAVY
BRACKETS,

SUBJECT: GUIDELINES FOR MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND
THEIR STAFFS WHILE TRAVELING ABROAD

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.

I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.


Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. Their mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions that

25 June - latest version, incorporating
proposed changes by DoD.

could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. [Several foreign governments or entities thereof now willing to cooperate privately with the U.S. in intelligence agreements-exchanges maintain strong^{ly} neutral or anti-U.S. foreign policies; continuation of such agreements-exchanges is therefore dependent upon avoidance of their public disclosure. In many cases termination of such agreements would result in the loss of unique strategic intelligence, and alternate collection methods are either not available or are prohibitively expensive.]

To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.



Agreement
→

III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

Bar

It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms--operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.

IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members

would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.

VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such

a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.

[Senate Select Committee principals and staff should understand the distinction between U.S. intelligence installations abroad and joint U.S.-foreign intelligence installations or foreign intelligence installations supported by the U.S. intelligence community. Access to the former is at the discretion of the U.S. Ambassador; access to the latter two is at the discretion of the foreign government involved.]

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized.

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T 105747 EIA405 PAGE 01 IN 613590

TORJ201921Z JUN 75 62615

SECRET 201745Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE 62615

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

REF A. DIRECTOR 707518

B. DIRECTOR 708791

D KB

1. THANK YOU FOR ADVICE REGARDING SENATOR MONDALE'S PROPOSED VISIT, AND [REDACTED] HAVE BOTH BEEN ALERTED.

2. IN RESPONSE TO PARA 6 REF A, COS PLANS TO BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE ON STRUCTURE [REDACTED]

AND THE NATURE OF OUR INTERFACE WITH IT WITH PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE GROUND RULES GOVERNING OUR RELATIONSHIP. COS WILL ALSO COVER THE STATION'S ORGANIZATION, PRIORITIES, AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE ANSWERS TO A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THAT OCCUR TO US:

- A. WHAT CLEARANCES DO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS TWO STAFF ASSISTANTS ~~HAVE?~~ ^{HAVE?}
- B. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE SENATOR BEEN INFORMED ABOUT AGEE CASE, AND IN WHAT DETAIL SHOULD THIS CASE BE COVERED WITH HIM AND HIS TWO ASSISTANTS?
- C. TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD

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101733Z

DIRECTOR

708791

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c/PELEGA, P/OLC, OLCS
c/c/OP3.

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TO:

[Redacted]

RYBATY

REF: DIRECTOR 707518 (NOT NEEDED)

[Redacted]

WFW
 [Handwritten initials]

1. (REF CONCERNED VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE TO EUROPE IN EARLY JULY ON SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES.) 4

2. SENATOR MONDALE'S ITINERARY IS NOT YET FIRM. NOW APPEARS HE WILL ARRIVE [Redacted] ON 30 JUNE FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN PROCEED OSLO AND HELSINKI FOR VISITS NOT CONNECTED WITH SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES. CURRENT PLANS BRING HIM TO [Redacted] 7 JULY FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN TO [Redacted] (1 DAY) AND [Redacted] (2 DAYS). NO DECISION YET AS TO WHICH CITY WILL BE VISITED [Redacted] (DIRECTLY FROM)

3. MR. DAVID AARON ADVISES THAT SENATOR WISHES THE DISCUSSIONS TO BE GENERIC IN NATURE. HE WANTS TO KNOW THE STATIONS' PRIORITIES AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN, BUT HE IS NOT SEEKING SPECIFICS. 4

4. MR. AARON STATES THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF SELECT COMMITTEE CONNECTIONS, AND IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE SENATOR'S PARTY WILL BE TRAVELING BY AIR FORCE OR COMMERCIAL

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RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INFO: FILE

708790

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5. [] MR. AARON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH []

[] BUT NOT THROUGH CIA ARRANGEMENT. SENATOR MONDALE HAS

ASKED FOR DISCUSSIONS []

WE ARE

NOT ASKED FOR ANY ASSISTANCE IN THIS AFFAIR.4

6. [] SENATOR MONDALE PLANS A SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT []

7. IN A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE TRIP, MR. AARON SAID THAT IN [] THE SENATOR WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND HOW THESE AFFECT THE OPERATIONAL PICTURE IN THAT CITY. []

THE SENATOR WILL WISH TO LOOK INTO [] RELATIONS AND MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN SEEING THE [] FACILITY. []

THE SENATOR WILL EXPECT TO REVIEW THE STATION'S VARIED PROGRAM. 4

8. WE NOTED THE SENATOR'S INVESTIGATION MAY STILL BE SUBJECT TO HIGHER LEVEL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DIRECTION OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN INFORMED. E2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 17 JUNE 1975
ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS
UNIT: C/EUR
EXT: 1012

E.H. KNOCHE

E.H. Knoche

W. W. Wells
WILLIAM W. WELLS, C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

John Waller
JOHN WALLER, SA/DDO
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE AND PLACE: 17 June 1975 1000 - 1100
Room 2E-45SUBJECT: Conversation by Mr. John Waller, SA/DDO with
Mr. David Aaron, member of Senator Mondale's
staff, with Regard to the Senator's Proposed
Trip to Europe

1. According to Mr. Aaron the Senator and Mr. Aaron's itinerary, while not yet fixed, will be along the following lines:

a. 30 June - 1 July [REDACTED]

b. Monday, 7 June: [REDACTED]

c. [REDACTED] Although the order has not yet been
determined, the [REDACTED] stop would be two days and the
[REDACTED] stop, one day.

In the period between [REDACTED] the party intends to visit Oslo and Helsinki. The purpose of this part of the trip, however, has nothing to do with the SSC [REDACTED]


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5. Mr. Waller commented that such approaches to foreign governments would make our liaison services uneasy and could adversely affect their willingness to cooperate. To this reason, we did not favor involving foreign governments -- at whatever level or wherever in the bureaucracy. Moreover, contacts with foreign governments increased the likelihood that the true purpose of the Senator's trip could leak to the press. Mr. Waller mentioned that he would want to bring this to the attention of others.

6. Mr. Aaron agreed that the Senator, through press conferences or otherwise, would not make public the fact that his trip was connected with Select Committee investigations.

7. Mr. Aaron said that he and the Senator were in touch with Mr. Hyland of the State Department with regard to this trip. He also suggested that they might get in touch with military intelligence services in Washington and in the field. He made specific reference to "Naval Intelligence".

8. Mr. Aaron stressed the fact that the itinerary was still tentative and subject to change.

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- 3 -

9. At one point, Mr. Aaron asked if CIA had any aircraft in Europe which could be put at Senator Mondale's disposal. Mr. Waller replied negatively.

10. Mr. Aaron felt that it was unlikely that Mr. Bader would be a member of the Senator's party.

Distribution:

1 - Mr. Knoche
1 - Mr. Wells
1 - Miss Page

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S E C R E T 166853Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE 26077

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 797518

Handwritten initials and signatures:
 OMB
 JW

1. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD GENERALLY PLAN BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE ON STATION'S POSITION WITHIN PRIMARY TARGETS, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT FOR OPERATIONS, CAN OF COURSE ADJUST TO SUIT HIS REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL COME INTO CLEARER FOCUS AFTER HQS BRIEFING MENTIONED PARA 0 REF.

2. IF POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION THAT STAFF AIDE, MR. WILLIAM BADER (PARA 2 REF) IS IDENTICAL WITH PERSON OF SAEM NAME WHO HAS FORD FOUNDATION REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS LATE SIXTIES AND AT THAT TIME WAS NAVAL RESERVE LIEUTENANT COMMANDER.

3. NO FILE, E2 IMPDET.

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TO: [Redacted]

MKS

RYBAT 4

SUBJECT: THE VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE OF MINNESOTA TO EUROPE AT THE END OF THE MONTH. 4

1. THE SENATORIAL PARTY WISHES TO VISIT [Redacted] TO EXAMINE AGENCY COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE FIELD. SENATOR MONDALE WILL WISH TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT HOW STATIONS OPERATE AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE [Redacted] PRESUMABLY THE SENATOR WILL ALSO WISH TO EXAMINE OUR [Redacted] RELATIONS. 4

2. SENATOR MONDALE WILL BE TRAVELING WITH HIS PERSONAL AIDE, MR. DAVID AARON, WHO IS THE DIRECTOR OF THE TASK FORCE ON COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING CIA ACTIVITIES. MR. WILLIAM BADER, A SECOND STAFF MEMBER, MAY ALSO ACCOMPANY THE SENATOR. 4

3. HEADQUARTERS WILL ~~SUGGEST~~ ^{REQUEST OF} SENATOR MONDALE THAT HE USE OTHER REASONS THAN THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION FOR HIS TRAVEL IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS. WE DO NOT KNOW, ^{YET} HOWEVER, IF HE WILL AGREE. 4

DATE:
 ORIG:
 UNIT:
 EXT:

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STAFF

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DIRECTOR

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4. YOU SHOULD ADVISE THE [REDACTED] OF THE SENATOR'S INTENTIONS TO VISIT HIS [REDACTED] AND THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT. PLEASE ASK THE [REDACTED] TO RESTRICT HIS CORRESPONDENCE TO WASHINGTON ABOUT THIS TRIP TO EITHER [REDACTED] LATER RESTRICTIONS MAY BE FORTHCOMING, DEPENDING ON HOW SENATOR MONDALE DECIDES TO HANDLE HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. 4

5. THE CODEL'S TENTATIVE ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS: DEPART 30 JUNE VIA COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6. REQUEST EACH COS ADVISE HEADQUARTERS OF HIS PLANS FOR BRIEFING THE SENATOR. 4

7. FOR [REDACTED] SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER A VISIT [REDACTED]

8. HEADQUARTERS WILL OFFER A BRIEFING TO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS PARTY AT HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE. E2, IMPDETH

9. MORE specific guidance on operational discussions to follow.

E.H. KNOCHE E.H. Knoche

LC Robert [unclear]

SA/DDO John [unclear]

DATE: 13 JUNE 1975
 ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS
 UNIT: C/EUR
 EXT: 1012

[Signature]
 DCI
 RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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 DDO
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SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select
Committee and Their Staffs While
Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:

- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to a host government.

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In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.

- Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.
- Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.
- Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

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No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.

- Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

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In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.

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6/18/75

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and
Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.

I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR SOME PURPOSE OTHER THAN THE INVESTIGATION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions

that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public exposure of such relationships. Some reason other than SSC business should be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff to help maintain the discreet nature of the visit. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.



III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U. S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of, or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.

IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be

to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.

VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered

essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized.

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